

Distributed Database

Munawar, PhD



**Semantic Integrity
Control
Sentralized & Distributed**



Semantic Data Control

Involves Semantic Data Control ;

- ❖ View management
- ❖ Security control
- ❖ Integrity control



View Management

View – virtual relation

- generated from base relation(s) by a query
- not stored as base relations

Example :

```
CREATE VIEW   SYSAN(ENO,ENAME)
AS          SELECT   ENO,ENAME
              FROM     EMP
              WHERE    TITLE= "Syst. Anal."
```

EMP

ENO	ENAME	TITLE
E1	J. Doe	Elect. Eng
E2	M. Smith	Syst. Anal.
E3	A. Lee	Mech. Eng.
E4	J. Miller	Programmer
E5	B. Casey	Syst. Anal.
E6	L. Chu	Elect. Eng.
E7	R. Davis	Mech. Eng.
E8	J. Jones	Syst. Anal.

SYSAN

ENO	ENAME
E2	M.Smith
E5	B.Casey
E8	J.Jones



View Management

Views can be manipulated as base relations

Example :

```
SELECT      ENAME, PNO, RESP
FROM        SYSAN, ASG
WHERE       SYSAN.ENO = ASG.ENO
```



Query Modification

Queries expressed on views

Queries expressed on base relations

Example :

```
SELECT ENAME, PNO, RESP  
FROM SYSAN, ASG  
WHERE SYSAN.ENO = ASG.ENO
```

```
SELECT ENAME, PNO, RESP  
FROM EMP, ASG  
WHERE EMP.ENO = ASG.ENO  
AND TITLE = "Syst. Anal."
```

ENAME	PNO	RESP
M.Smith	P1	Analyst
M.Smith	P2	Analyst
B.Casey	P3	Manager
J.Jones	P4	Manager



View Management

- ❖ To restrict access

**CREATE
AS**

**VIEW
SELECT
FROM
WHERE
AND**

ESAME
*
EMP E1, EMP E2
E1.TITLE = E2.TITLE
E1.ENO = **USER**

- ❖ Query

**SELECT
FROM**

*
ESAME

ENO	ENAME	TITLE
E1	J. Doe	Elect. Eng
E2	L. Chu	Elect. Eng



View Updates

❖ Updatable

```
CREATE      VIEW      SYSAN(ENO,ENAME)  
AS         SELECT    ENO,ENAME  
            FROM      EMP  
            WHERE    TITLE="Syst. Anal."
```

❖ Non-updatable

```
CREATE      VIEW      EG(ENAME,RESP)  
AS         SELECT    ENAME,RESP  
            FROM      EMP, ASG  
            WHERE    EMP.ENO=ASG.ENO
```



Data Security

❖ **Data protection**

- Prevents the physical content of data to be understood by unauthorized users
- Uses encryption/decryption techniques (Public key)

❖ **Access control**

- Only authorized users perform operations they are allowed to on database objects
- Discretionary access control (DAC)
 - Long been provided by DBMS with authorization rules
- Multilevel access control (MAC)
 - Increases security with security levels



Discretionary Access Control

❖ **Main actors**

- Subjects (users, groups of users) who execute operations
- Operations (in queries or application programs)
- Objects, on which operations are performed

❖ **Checking whether a subject may perform an op. on an object**

- Authorization= (subject, op. type, object def.)
- Defined using GRANT OR REVOKE
- Centralized: one single user class (admin.) may grant or revoke
- Decentralized, with op. type GRANT
 - More flexible but recursive revoking process which needs the hierarchy of grants



Multilevel Access Control

- ❖ **Different security levels (*clearances*)**
 - *Top Secret > Secret > Confidential > Unclassified*
- ❖ **Access controlled by 2 rules:**
 - **No read up**
 - subject S is allowed to read an object of level L only if $level(S) \geq L$
 - Protect data from unauthorized disclosure, e.g. a subject with secret clearance cannot read top secret data
 - **No write down:**
 - subject S is allowed to write an object of level L only if $level(S) \leq L$
 - Protect data from unauthorized change, e.g. a subject with top secret clearance can only write top secret data but not secret data (which could then contain top secret data)



Distributed Access Control

❖ **Additional problems in a distributed environment**

- Remote user authentication
 - Typically using a directory service
 - Should be replicated at some sites for availability
- Management of DAC rules
 - Problem if users' group can span multiple sites
 - Rules stored at some directory based on user groups location
 - Accessing rules may incur remote queries
- Covert channels in MAC



Semantic Integrity Control

Maintain database consistency by enforcing a set of constraints defined on the database.

❖ **Structural constraints**

- basic semantic properties inherent to a data model e.g., unique key constraint in relational model

❖ **Behavioral constraints**

- regulate application behavior, e.g., dependencies in the relational model

❖ **Two components**

- Integrity constraint specification
- Integrity constraint enforcement



Semantic Integrity Control

❖ **Procedural**

control embedded in each application program

❖ **Declarative**

assertions in predicate calculus

- easy to define constraints
- definition of database consistency clear
- inefficient to check assertions for each update
 - limit the search space
 - decrease the number of data accesses/assertion
 - preventive strategies
 - checking at compile time

Thank You !

Munawar, PhD

